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Abstract
In order to prevent deep neural networks from be-
ing infringed by unauthorized parties, we propose
a generic solution which embeds a designated
digital passport into a network, and subsequently,
either paralyzes the network functionalities for
unauthorized usages or maintain its functionali-
ties in the presence of a verified passport. Such a
desired network behavior is successfully demon-
strated in a number of implementation schemes,
which provide reliable, preventive and timely pro-
tections against tens of thousands of fake-passport
deceptions. Extensive experiments also show that
the deep neural network performance under unau-
thorized usages deteriorate significantly (e.g. with
33% to 82% reductions of CIFAR10 classification
accuracies), while networks endorsed with valid
passports remain intact.
1. Introduction
While Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has emerged
as a viable and lucrative business model, there is an urgent
need to protect deep neural networks (DNN) from being
used, copied and re-distributed by unauthorized parties (i.e.
intellectual property infringement). Recently, for instance,
digital watermarking techniques have been adopted to em-
bed watermarks into DNN models during the training stage.
Subsequently, ownerships of these models are verified by the
detection of the embedded watermarks, which are supposed
to be robust to multiple types of DNN modifications such
as fine-tuning, pruning and watermark overwriting (Uchida
et al., 2017; Le Merrer et al., 2017; Adi et al., 2018).
The principle of digital watermarking for neural network
models is mainly inspired by the protection of intellectual
property right (IPR) of digital media such as images or
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Figure 1. A comparison of CIFAR10 classification test accuracies
of original network (“orig”) against protected network with valid
passports (“valid”), protected network with fake passports (“fake”),
and network with hidden parameters reverse-engineered (“RevE”).
It shows that the proposed method is resilient against various
attacks and provides a proactive IPR protection in opposition to
infringements by paralyzing the network performance (e.g. from
92%→± 15%).
videos, which are being processed by media processors e.g.
photo galleries or video players. Nevertheless, this approach
disregards a unique and fundamental feature of neural net-
work models — themselves are information processors that
fulfill certain tasks, including the classification, detection or
manipulation of input information. Therefore, a novel and
preferable strategy in neural network IP protection is to par-
alyze the DNN models against unauthorized parties, while
maintaining their normal functionalities for lawful usage.
To this end, a designated digital entity must be presented to
endorse authorized usage of the protected network in ques-
tion. We refer to this type of protection entities as digital
passports and, correspondingly, the process of embedding
digital passports into a DNN model is referred to as digital
passporting. Within this paper, we shall illustrate how to
embed digital passports so that the resulting DNN models
are both functionality-preserving and well-protected (see
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definitions in Section 2.1).
On the one hand, digital passporting bears a similarity to
digital watermarking — they both embed certain digital en-
tities into DNN models during training sessions. In terms of
the IPRs protection, however, embedded watermarks only
enable the verification of the ownership of DNN models.
One has to rely on the government investigation and enforc-
ing actions to discourage the infringement of IPRs. More
often than not, this kind of juridical protection might be
unreliable, costly and long-overdue. On the other hand,
passports-protected DNN models will not function normally
unless valid passports are provided, thus immediately pre-
venting the unlawful usages of the networks with no extra
costs. Indeed, we regard this proactive protection the most
prominent advantage of digital passporting over digital wa-
termarking. For instance, as shown in Figure 1 of CIFAR10
classification performances, the protected networks with
valid passports demonstrated almost identical accuracies
as that of the original network, while the same networks
presented with fake passports merely achieved about 10%
classification rates. Moreover, even if a computationally de-
manding reverse-engineering algorithm was used to recover
protected network parameters (see Section 3.1), the best
accuracies obtained was no more than 70%, substantially
inferior to that of the protected network i.e. 92%.
To our best knowledge, the present paper is the first work
that shows how to embed and use digital passports to prevent
DNN models from being infringed by unauthorized parties.
Section 1.1 reviews recent digital watermarking techniques
developed for DNNs. Section 2 details the DNN architec-
tures for embedding and verifying digital passports of target
DNN models. Section 3 explains the digital passports as
watermarks; with extensive experiment results in Section 4
demonstrates the efficacy of the passporting method.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We renovate the paradigm of digital watermarking
based neural network IP protection, by proposing a
digital passporting based strategy which provides re-
liable, preventive and timely IP protection at virtually
no extra cost for all neural networks.
• This paper formulates the digital passporting problem
and proposes a generic solution as well as concrete
implementation schemes that embed digital passports
into DNN models through dedicated passporting layers
(Section 2; Figure 2). The embedded passports prevent
the unauthorized network usage (infringement) by para-
lyzing the networks while maintaining its functionality
for verified users (Section 4.2; Figure 6).
• Our work shows that the embedded passports also ver-
ify the ownership of networks, in case that the DNN
hidden parameters are illegally disclosed or reverse-
engineered while public parameters are plagiarized
(Section 3).
1.1. Related work
(Uchida et al., 2017) was probably the first work that pro-
posed a general framework to embed watermarks into DNN
models by imposing an additional regularization term on the
weights parameters i.e. ER(w), which is dependent on the
watermarks to be embedded. It was shown that the perfor-
mances of the original networks (for image classifications)
were not affected by the embedded watermarks, and the
ownership of network models were robustly verified against
a variety of modifications like fine-tuning and pruning.
However, the aforementioned method was limited in the
sense that one has to access all the network weights in
question to extract the embedded watermarks (i.e. white-
box setting). Therefore, (Le Merrer et al., 2017) proposed
to embed watermarks in the classification labels of adver-
sarial examples, so that the watermarks can be extracted
remotely through a service API without the need to access
the network internal weights parameters (i.e. black-box
setting). Later, (Adi et al., 2018) proved that embedding wa-
termarks in the networks’ (classification) outputs is actually
a designed backdooring and provided theoretical analysis
of performances under various conditions. Also in black-
box and white box settings, (Darvish Rouhani et al., 2018;
Chen et al., 2018; Jia & Potkonjak, 2018) demonstrated
how to embed watermarks (or fingerprints), that are robust
to watermark overwriting, model fine-tuning and pruning.
Noticeably, a wide variety of DNN architectures such as
Wide Residual Networks (WRNs) and Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) were investigated.
(Mun et al., 2017) employed two CNN networks to embed
a one-bit watermark in a single image block; while (Vukoti
et al., 2018) investigates a new family of transformation
based on Deep Learning networks for blind image water-
marking. In one of the latest work, IBM team - (Zhang
et al., 2018) proposed to use three types of watermarks (i.e.
content, unrelated and noise) and demonstrated their perfor-
mances with MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Lastly, (Zhu
et al., 2018) proposed an end-to-end trainable framework,
HiDDeN for data hiding in color images based on CNNs
and Generative Adversarial Network and may be applied to
watermarking and steganography.
2. Digital Passport for Deep Neural Networks
The ultimate goal of digital passporting is to design and
train DNN models in a way such that, only if a designated
digital passport (or signature) is presented, will the protected
networks function normally. Otherwise, the functionalities
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of the original networks will be paralyzed. In the following,
we shall first formulate the desired characteristics of the
DNN protected by the digital passports, and illustrate a
generic solution as well as concrete implementation schemes
that are employed to embed the digital passports into a
convolutional neural network (CNN)1.
2.1. Problem formulation
LetN denote a CNN model to be protected by a secret digi-
tal passport p, after a training or passporting process, the net-
work embedded with the passport is denoted by N [p]. The
inference of such a protected model can be characterized as
a process M that modifies network behavior according to
the running-time digital passport s:
M(N [p], s) =
{ Mp, if s = p,
Mp¯, otherwise, (1)
in which Mp is the network performance with passport
correctly verified, and Mp¯ is the performance with the
incorrect passports i.e. p¯ 6= p.
The properties of M(N [p], s) defined below are desired for
the sake of intellectual property protection:
Definition 1. If s = p, the performanceMp should be as
close as possible to that of the original network N . Specifi-
cally, if the performance inconsistency betweenMp and that
of N is smaller than a desired threshold e.g. τd = 1%, then
the protected network is called functionality-preserving.
Definition 2. If s 6= p, on the other hand, the performance
Mp¯ should be as far as possible to that ofMp. The dis-
crepancy betweenMp andMp¯ therefore can be defined as
the protection-strength. Moreover, if the strength is larger
than a desired threshold e.g. τs = 50%, then the network in
question is called well-protected.
2.2. A generic solution
In order to modify the behavior of the CNN as formulated in
(1), we propose the following generic solution: we first par-
tition the set of CNN parameters into two non-overlapping
subsets i.e. W = {Wp,Wh}, and use the public parame-
ters Wp, together with the secret passport p, to determine
the hidden2parameters Wh. Formally, this principle can be
illustrated as follows:
Wh = F(Wp, p), (2)
in which F denotes a set of mathematical functions that
calculate the values of Wh from the given Wp and p. We
1This paper shall only focus on digital passporting of CNNs.
The passporting of other network architectures such as GANs is
out of the scope of this paper, and will be reported elsewhere.
2In this work, traditional hidden layer parameters are consid-
ered as public parameters unless they are protected by (2).
Fγ(W lp, plγ) Fβ(W lp, plβ)
V1 Avg(W lp ∗ plγ) B
V2 B Avg(W lp ∗ plβ)
V3 Avg(W lp ∗ plγ) Avg(W lp ∗ plβ)
Table 1. Three different choices of passport functions (B means
the parameter is a trainable variable as in standard Batch Normal-
ization layer, ∗ denotes the convolution of p with kernel W , and
Avg denotes the channel-wise average of convolution outputs).
refer to F as passport functions in the rest of the present
paper.
The learning or the digital passporting of a CNN model
therefore involves the optimization of the network objective
function e.g. to minimize the cross entropy loss by adjusting
public parameters Wp. The hidden parameters Wh are no
longer trainable, instead, they are directly updated according
to (2).
During the inferencing stage, the hidden parameters is com-
puted with the running-time passport i.e. Wh = F(Wp, s).
Clearly, only if the designated secret passport is provided
s = p , will the hidden parameters Wh be set correctly.
Otherwise, the CNN functionalities will be paralyzed due
to incorrect values of hidden parameters Wh.
2.3. Concrete implementations
A concrete implementation of the generic solution therefore
has to answer two questions:
1. How to partition the CNN parameters into Wp,Wh?
2. Which mathematical functions F are to be used?
We shall illustrate below a number of implementation
schemes, which have their respective answers to the above
questions. In particular, the implementations are inspired
by the commonly adopted batch normalization technique,
which essentially applies the channel-wise linear transfor-
mation to the inputs (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015).
In this work, we propose to append after each convolution
or fully connected layer a digital passporting layer, whose
scale factor γ and bias shift term β are dependent on both the
weights of the preceding layer Wp and the secret passport p
as follows:
P l(xp) = γ
lxp + β
l, (3)
γl = Fγ(W lp, plγ), (4)
βl = Fβ(W lp, plβ), (5)
in which l denotes the layer number, xp is the input to the
passport layer, P () is the corresponding linear transforma-
tion outputs, Fγ and Fβ are the passport functions, while
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Figure 2. An example ResNet layer that consists of two convolution
layers, two digital passporting layers and the ReLU activation. xlc
and xlp are, respectively, inputs to the convolution and passporting
layers, pl = {plγ , plβ} is the digital passports of corresponding
layers. F is a passport function to compute the hidden parameters
(i.e. γ and β) of the passporting layers. Note that secret passports
pl are used during the learning stage, while running-time passports
s are used during the inferencing stage.
plγ and p
l
β are the passports used to derive scale factor and
bias term respectively. Figure 2 depicts the architecture of
digital passport layers used in a ResNet layer and Table 1
summarizes different choices of passport functions Fγ ,Fβ
that have been employed in our work.
The practical choice of formula (3),(4) and (5) is inspired
by the Batch Normalization (BN) layer (Ioffe & Szegedy,
2015), and that is also why V1,V2 still train γ or β follow-
ing BN. Respective performances of these three choices,
against different attacks, are illustrated and discussed in the
following sections (see Section 3.1 and 4).
It turns out that the introduction of digital passporting layers
does not affect the convergence of parameter tunings, as
shown in Figure 3, we observe that both the test accuracy
and the computed linear transformation parameters γ and
β stagnate in the later learning phase. More specifically,
as demonstrated by experimental results in Section 4, the
performance discrepancies between the passport-protected
networks and the original counterparts are no more than,
respectively, 1% and 5% for cifar10 and cifar100 classifica-
tion experiments investigated in this papers. This superior
functionality-preserving capability is ascribed to the fact
that the original objective functions remain unaltered during
the learning stage3.
3In contrast, the objective functions are inevitably changed with
the addition of certain regularization terms to embed watermarks
(Uchida et al., 2017; Le Merrer et al., 2017; Adi et al., 2018).
Digital passporting by fine-tuning: note that the proposed
digital passporting method can be applied with public param-
eters Wp either being initialized from a pre-trained model
or being trained from scratch using the standard initializa-
tion methods e.g. He initialization method (He et al., 2015).
Figure 3 shows a comparison between passport network
train from-pretrained (blue) and from-scratch (green).
As shown, the training initialized with pre-trained models
struggles with drastic changes in hidden parameters and the
final accuracy is inferior to that of the training from scratch
approach. We therefore do not conduct more experiments
with fine-tuning in our work.
2.4. Generation and attacking of passport
Public parameters of a passport protected DNN might be
easily plagiarized, then the plagiarizer has to deceive the
network with certain passports. The chance of success of
such an attacking strategy depends on the odds of correctly
guessing the secret passports. Figure 4 illustrates three
different types of passports which have been investigated in
our work:
a) random patterns, whose elements are independently
randomly generated according to the uniform distribu-
tion between [-1, 1]. Correspondingly, the attack for
this type of passports is also generated in the same vein.
We refer to this combination of passport-attack as T1
type (see Table 2).
The chance for a random attack to coincide with the
random pattern passport is extremely low, thus, strong
protection against attacks are guaranteed. Yet the down-
side is that it is hard to associate these random pat-
terns with person or corporate identity, which are often
needed to prove the network ownership. Also, the aver-
age values of random patterns might concur with each,
due to the uniform distribution of each element, thus
jeopardizing the protection strengths.
b) one4 selected image is fed through a trained network
with the same architecture, and the corresponding fea-
ture maps are collected. Then the selected image is
used at the input layer and the corresponding feature
maps are used at other layers as passports. We refer
to passports generated as such the fixed image pass-
port. The corresponding passport-attack combination
is denoted as T2 in Table 2.
The image passport is advantageous since it is straight-
forward to associate them with person or corporate
identity. However, the protection strength provided
by a single image passport is limited as plagiarizers
4Two images are needed for the V3 passport functions defined
in Table 1.
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(a) Magnitude of weight update, scale factor γ and bias term β are having larger fluctuation as compared to passport network from scratch.
(b) Pretrained passport network (blue) stops update after few epochs for unknown reason
(c) Pretrained passport network (blue) does not update at all. Scale factor γ stays at 0 and bias terms β stays near -0.5
Figure 3. Left to right: Magnitudes of weight update, scale factor γ and bias terms β of one passporting layer over 200 epochs for the
training of CIFAR10 classification. The networks are either initialized with the pre-trained model (blue) or from the scratch (green).
might initiate attacks with image with similar or near
duplicate contents.
c) a set ofN selected images are fed through a trained net-
work with the same architecture, and N corresponding
feature maps are collected at each layer. Among the N
options only one is randomly selected as the passport
at each layer. Specifically, for a set of N images being
applied to a network with L(< K) layers, there are all
together NL possible combinations of passports that
can be generated. We refer to passports generated as
such the random image passports, which feature both
strong protection strengths and easy association with
person or corporate identity.
Attackers for this type of passports have to pick up one
passport at each layer, even if they have knowledge
about the set of N images, the chances of guessing the
correct passport is merely 1
NL
. This type of passport
attacking is denoted as T3.
Respective performances of the above passports and attacks
are demonstrated in Section 4.
3. Digital Passports as Watermarks
In case that the original training datasets are somehow
made available to plagiarizers, they may opt for reverse-
engineering the hidden parameters directly. The functional-
ity of the protected networks might be retained, to various
extents, depending on how successful the hidden parame-
ters can be recovered. As shown in following subsection,
the chance of success actually depends on which passport
functions (in Table 1) are adopted.
3.1. A reverse-engineering attack of hidden parameters
Given the original training datasets, in principle, the hidden
parametersWh might be reverse-engineered by setting them
as trainable variables while holding the cloned public pa-
rameters Wp as constants. Then the optimization algorithm
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4. Example of different types of passports: (a) random
patterns, (b) fixed image and (c) random image
shall adjust the hidden parameters to minimize the training
error e.g. the cross-entropy loss.
On the one hand, the reverse-engineering attack is able to
successfully recover the hidden bias terms for the vulner-
able choice (V1) of passport functions (with the reverse-
engineered accuracies reaching almost 92% for CIFAR10
classification). On the other hand, the more resilient pass-
port functions (i.e. V2 and V3) demonstrate better protec-
tion strengths against the reverse engineering attack — the
best accuracy the attacker can achieve is no more than 70%
(please consult more results in Section 4.3 and supplemen-
tary material). Taking into account the crippled network per-
formance, the exceedingly high computational cost as well
as the high-priced skills required for setting up the reverse-
engineering attack, we regard this attacking approach un-
profitable and demotivating for plagiarizers who intend to
seek commercial benefits.
3.2. Verification of suspect network ownership
We shall show below, even if the hidden parameters are
reverse-engineered or illegally disclosed, the ownership of
the protected networks can still be verified by the designed
network behavior which is highly dependent on the desig-
nated passports as formulated in (1). Under this circum-
stance, digital passports play the role of digital watermarks
in the white box setting (Uchida et al., 2017).
As shown in Figure 3, the hidden parameters converge to
specific constant values clγ , c
l
β that lead to the desired per-
formance i.e. Mp. Therefore, the public parameter and
the secret passport are actually constrained by the passport
functions (4) and (5):
Fγ(W lp, plγ) = clγ , Fβ(W lp, plβ) = clβ . (6)
Bearing this constraint in mind, we propose to verify the
ownership of a suspect plagiarized network by the following
steps:
1. Remove the hidden variables from the network, and
replace them with the passport functions (4) and (5) as
originally designed;
Figure 5. Top row (right to left): the original passport image (plane)
and 3 example images added with random noise to 1000, 2000,
3000 elements respectively. Bottom row: 4 red histograms (right to
left) are distributions of test accuracies for CIFAR10 classification,
measured with the original passport and those added with random
noise as in the top row.
2. Feed the network with the secret passports p and check
whether the test accuracy of a pre-determined set of
test samples is the same as the expected performance
Mp. Since the chance of enabling the network with a
random guess is extremely low (e.g. 1
NL
for those pro-
tected by random image passport, see Section 2.4), one
can confidently claim the ownership if the verification
outcome is positive;
3. Moreover, add random noise to a varying percentage of
the secret passport elements i.e. pe(c) = p+ e(c), c ∈
{0%, 100%}, and check whether the test accuracy us-
ing passports pe(c) is the same as to the set of pre-
recorded performances Mpe(c) (see Figure 5 for an
example). One can claim the ownership if the verifica-
tion outcome is positive.
In order to enhance the justification of ownership, one can
furthermore select either personal identification pictures or
corporate logos (Figure 4c) during the designing of the fixed
or random image passports (see definitions in Section 2.4).
It must be noted that, using passports as proofs of ownership
to stop infringements is the last resort, only if the hidden
parameters are illegally disclosed or (partially) recovered.
We believe this juridical protection is often not necessary
since the proposed technological solution actually provides
proactive, rather than reactive, IP protection of deep neural
networks.
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Protection Strength (S in %) Performance Inconsistency (I in %)
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
V1 ResNet (92.72) 48.39 (4.31) 33.48 (24.21) 76.04 (6.42) +0.19 (0.17) +0.21 (0.17) +0.37 (0.18)
V2 ResNet (92.72) 82.50 (0.24) 59.54 (23.42) 82.51 (1.05) -0.21 (0.22) +0.07 (0.18) +0.10 (0.10)
V3
ResNet (92.72) 82.57 (0.27) 78.98 (8.95) 81.86 (0.93) -0.15 (0.20) -0.81 (0.32) -0.73 (0.24)
VGGNet (92.24) - - 82.26 (0.35) - - +0.02 (0.26)
AlexNet (86.41) - - 76.83 (1.59) - - +0.82 (0.23)
Table 2. A comparison of CIFAR10 classification performances, in terms of protection strength and performance inconsistency of protected
networks against various attacks. The scores next to each network are test accuracies of the original networks (Ao). Other scores are
average S or I , and in bracket() are standard deviations.
Protection Performance
Strength Inconsistency
V3
ResNet (70.19) 71.14 (0.19) +1.99 (0.23)
VGGNet (70.86) 66.98 (0.01) -2.88 (0.37)
AlexNet (58.19) 61.33 (0.33) +4.21 (0.49)
Table 3. CIFAR100: A comparison in terms of protection strength
and performance inconsistency of various protected networks
against T3 attacks. The scores next to each network are test accu-
racies of the original networks (Ao). Other scores are average S
or I , and in bracket() are standard deviations.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experiment setup
In our experiments, we investigated two image classifica-
tion tasks i.e. CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, with three popular
deep learning architectures i.e. ResNet (He et al., 2016),
VGGNet (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) and the seminal
Alexnet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). Detailed descriptions
of the datasets, network architectures as well as the hyper-
parameters of the training algorithm are elaborated in the
supplementary material.
For each task & datasets, we trained multiple networks with
different passport functions and tested them against different
attacking strategies. Performances of the passport-protected
network were reported using histograms of their respective
accuracies (see Figure 6 for the experiment results). In
terms of quantitative evaluation metrics, we adopted the
performance inconsistency and protection strength, defined
in Section 2.1, which are also given as follows:
I = Ao −Ap, S = Ap −At, (7)
in which I stands for inconsistency, S for protection
strength, and Ao, Ap, At denote, respectively, test accura-
cies of the original, the protected and the attacked networks.
4.2. Protection performances against passport attacks
Following experiments are carried out to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed digital passport method. First, for
any given network architectures, they are embedded with
the three different types of passports introduced in Section
2.4 where each network repeats 5 times with different pass-
ports being embedded. Test accuracies of the 5 protected
networks with corresponding valid passports are measured.
Second, for each passport embedded network, 1000 fake-
passport attacks are attempted with resulting test accuracies
measured. Third, for each protected network, three different
passport functions (i.e. V1,V2,V3) introduced in Table 1
are adopted and the resulting test accuracies are measured.
Figure 6 illustrates histograms of CIFAR10 classification
accuracies measured, respectively, for the original network,
the protected network with valid or fake passports, using
different passport functions. Table 2 summarizes the aver-
aged performance inconsistencies and protection strengths,
over all passport protected networks.
Functionality-preserving: First, it is observed that the per-
formance inconsistency between the original and the pro-
tected networks is no more than 1% for all networks. This
is an important result as it shows that the original objective
functions remain unaltered during the learning stage.
Well-protected: Second, it shows that the protection
strength of the digital passport based network is ranging
from 33% up to 83%. Among three types of passport func-
tions, the V3 passport function provides the most resilient
protection with the protection strength consistently larger
than 76%.
As a summary, the networks embedded with passport func-
tions V2/V3 are consistently functionality-preserving and
well-protected when τd = 1%, τs = 50%, as defined in
Section 2.1. In contrast, the combination of V1 passport
functions and the fixed image passport provides the most
vulnerable protection, with averaged protection strength
merely being 33%. Inspection of the histogram in Figure
6 shows that the most aggressive attack may achieve the
test accuracy near 90%. As a result of this vulnerability,
for the experiments with other network architectures and
CIFAR100, we skip the V1 and only use the V3 passport
function, together with the random image passports and T3
passport attacks.
CIFAR100: We also conducted the same experiments in
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Protection Performance
Strength Inconsistency
T1 T3 T1 T3
V1
ResNet (92.72) 0.56 0.19 -0.26 -0.26
VGGNet (92.24) 0.13 0.18 +2.7 +2.64
AlexNet (86.41) 0.24 0.15 -1.38 -1.58
V2
ResNet (92.72) 26.61 25.36 +0.02 +0.03
VGGNet (92.24) 33.57 31.55 +3.56 +2.55
AlexNet (86.41) 19.24 18.02 -0.15 -0.93
V3
ResNet (92.72) 25.69 22.93 +0.31 +0.31
VGGNet (92.24) 33.36 22.21 +2.77 +0.36
AlexNet (86.41) 14.85 12.00 -1.25 -0.88
Table 4. A comparison of CIFAR10 classification performances,
in terms of protection strength and performance inconsistency of
protected networks against RevAs attacks. The scores next to each
network are test accuracies of the original networks (Ao).
this public dataset (see Table 3 for results), and the perfor-
mance inconsistency is between -3 to 4% and the network
protection strength is ranging from 61% up to 71%. Note
that for ResNet and Alexnet, the test accuracies of the pro-
tected networks are actually higher than the original. Also,
the fake-passport attacking accuracies for both ResNet and
VGGNet are about 1%, virtually equivalent to random guess-
ing of 1 out 100 classes.
4.3. Protection performance against
reverse-engineering attacks
For each network model constructed for experiments in
Section 4.2, we apply the reverse-engineering attack (RevA)
as illustrated in Section 3.1 and measure the performance
of the recovered networks. Each type of network repeats 5
times as stated before, and Figure 7 illustrates the histograms
of measured accuracies distributions, respectively, for the
reverse-engineered networks and the protected network with
valid passports. Corresponding protection strengths and
performance inconsistency are summarized in Table 4.
It was observed that the network protected by the V1 pass-
port function is vulnerable to RevAs, and this is particularly
true for the random image passport. On the other hand,
the networks have a better protection with V2/V3 passport
functions, where the protection strengths are around 24%.
While the network functionality is not completely disabled,
taking into account the high computational costs of RevAs
attacks, we view the protection against RevAs is effective.
Finally, as a last resort, the embedded passport images can
be associated with person or corporate identities as depicted
in Figure 4c. This provides an easily verifiable approach to
claim ownership of protected networks.
4.4. Distribution of test accuracies with different deep
architecture
This section describes distributions of the test accuracies
with different networks on CIFAR10 (Figure 8) and CI-
FAR100 (Figure 9), respectively. For each histogram, green
line represents test accuracy of the original network, red
histogram represents test accuracies with the correct pass-
ports and blue histogram represents test accuracies with
fake passports.
5. Discussions and Conclusions
We renovated the paradigm in recent studies of digital water-
marking for deep neural network protections, by proposing
to paralyze network functionalities for unauthorized usages,
and thus, preventing IP infringements in a cost-effective,
proactive and timely manner. The proposed generic solu-
tion and implementation schemes are proved, by extensive
experiment results, to be effective, reliable and resilient
against tens of thousands of fake passport attacks and revere-
engineering attacks.
We believe this paper puts forward a new research direction
for the study of deep neural networks IP protection which
is urgently needed. Our future works include the passport
protection of other network architectures such as GANs,
which is feasible according to the generic solution principle,
yet remains to be investigated empirically.
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(a) Passport function V1
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(b) Passport function V2
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(c) Passport function V3
Figure 6. CIFAR10: Distributions of the test accuracies (%) with ResNet. Each histogram: green line (test accuracy of the original
network), red histogram (test accuracies with the correct passports) and blue histogram (test accuracies with fake passports). Left to
right: Passport types as described at Section 2.4 - random patterns, fixed image and random image passports, respectively.
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(a) ResNet18
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(b) VGG16
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(c) AlexNet
Figure 7. Histogram of reverse engineering attack for passport type T3: random images. Left to right: Passport function V1 to V3. Due
to histogram bar overlapping, the purple colour bar is the resultant colour of blue colour overlaps with red colour.
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(a) VGGNet (b) AlexNet
Figure 8. CIFAR10: Distributions of the test accuracies (%) with VGGNet and AlexNet using passport function V3 with random image
passports.
(a) ResNet (b) VGGNet (c) AlexNet
Figure 9. CIFAR100: Distributions of the test accuracies (%) with VGGNet and AlexNet using Passport function V3 with random image
passports.
